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I. INTRODUCTION
In April, 1984 someone shot and killed a British
policewoman with an automatic weapon fired from a window of
the Libyan People's Bureau in London. The following July a
British Custom's agent stopped two crates being shipped from
London to Nigeria, ostensibly diplomatic pouches, which
contained four men, one of which was a Nigerian exile that
the Nigerian government wanted returned to their country for
trial. Agents from Nigeria kidnapped and were attempting to
smuggle the man back to their country through diplomatic
channels so that he could be tried on charges brought
against him by the new military government. On May 13, 1981
a man attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in Rome.
The man was apprehended and later confessed that he and an
accomplice were hired by agents from Bulgaria and their
escape had been arranged by the Bulgarian government using
diplomatic vehicles from the Bulgarian Embassy in Italy.
These examples are only a few in which terrorists and
nations have abused the privileges granted to diplomats to
accomplish their missions. Also significant is the fact
that evidence indicates and reason dictates that the
governments involved had prior knowledge of the events and
supported the questionable acts in them.
International terrorism is a growing problem. State
support of terrorism increases the problem and makes it more
difficult to combat. The terrorists often seem to be one
step ahead of those who would counter them and their tactics
take advantage of every opportunity afforded them. The
terrorists have the special advantage of the initiative of
selecting their targets and the element of surprise in
attacking them. By exploiting these advantages and other
tools available, they are able to strike in carefully
planned setpiece attacks having high probability of success.
Diplomatic laws have been developed over the years in an
effort to afford every protection to men conducting govern-
ment business among nations. Freedom from arrest, deten-
tion, and general harassment are guaranteed to diplomats so
that they may accomplish their mission. Similar protection
of embassies and diplomatic bags is an important aspect of
diplomatic privilege. States supporting terrorists have
allowed those terrorists to take advantage of the privileges
granted to diplomats to transport weapons and people and
support their acts of violence.
A. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
International terrorism is not a new problem but it is
one which has grown tremendously in the past few years in
its scope and magnitude. There are many arguments about who
or what groups are international terrorists but most people
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who study the problem agree that terrorism is a political
phenomenon, related to revolutionary movements. The U.S.
Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncom-
batant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state
agents," and international terrorism as, "terrorism
involving citizens or territory of more than one country"
[Ref. 1]. Generally terrorist groups do not have the power
base necessary to support a full scale revolution nor the
ability to run a government if they were able to take over.
Instead, the terrorists mount attacks which generate fear by
the outrageous display of violence designed to attract
maximum media coverage. They want to publicize their
political goals and demands and perceived social injustice.
The fact that terrorist attacks have not increased
significantly in the past five years does not necessarily
mean that the problem is stabilizing or declining. The most
notable statistic is the fact that although the number of
attacks remained somewhat constant (an average of 500 per
year from 1979 to 1983; unfortunately the statistics for the
first six months of 1984 show a 25% increase in incidents
over the same period of 1983) the number of casualties
suffered in those attacks rose significantly in 1983. There
were 1,925 casualties in 1983 (652 killed and 1,273
injured), the most since comprehensive records began being
11
kept in 1968. The alarming increase is due in part to the
fact that a number of terrorist groups have attacked lower
level targets with higher casualties rather than attempt to
strike high level but well protected targets. A prime
example of this is the October/ 1983 bombing of the French
and U.S. military facilities in Beirut which left over 300
dead. The weapons of choice in 1983 appeared to be various
types of bombs with very high explosive content which
produce high numbers of casualties indiscriminately and
effectively. Such weapons and tactics are difficult to
defend against/ they cause great destruction/ and they
attract widespread publicity.
The most disturbing fact of the continuing struggle
against international terrorism is the evidence of increased
state support of international terrorists. Facts indicate
that Syrians and Iranians bombed three major installations
in Beirut and Kuwait/ North Korean military personnel
planted a bomb in Rangoon that killed members of the South
Korean Cabinet/ and as discussed previously a member of the
Libyan People's Bureau in London killed a British
policewoman. [Ref. 2]
Governments are not only directly involved in terrorist
acts by sending their agents to perform the attacks/ but are
also supporting terrorists with arms, supplies, money,
transportation/ and refuge. The fact that the Soviet Union
12
and its Eastern Bloc allies have for a long time provided
training bases and weapons for terrorists is well known.
The London Economic Summit in June, 1984 noted with serious
concern that the incidents of abuse of diplomatic privilege
and immunity were increasing and that the evidence of states
supporting terrorists was also increasing. [Ref. 3]
Historically, governments implement coun termeasures to
combat terrorism after a particular act becomes a common
occurrence. An example is the practice of skyjacking.
Although this type of terror still happens occasionally,
recent cooperation effected among nations and the associated
practices implemented internationally have appreciably
decreased the incidents of skyjacking. Similarly, the
problem of abuses of diplomatic agreements must be addressed
and effective measures implemented to halt such abuse before
it becomes unmanageable. Governments must be concerned that
a breakdown of diplomatic relations worldwide caused by
continued violations of diplomatic agreements would be
detrimental to world peace and security. The continued
growth of international terrorism also has serious
implications in the future for world political stability.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC LAWS
In 1961, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
became the standard for diplomatic law worldwide. This is
not the first such agreement though it is generally accepted
13
today as the basis for relations between nations and it is
by far the most comprehensive. Since nations appeared
historically there has been conflict among them, and
diplomatic rules and agreements have been used to settle
disputes, particularly in modern times. A diplomat from a
nation conducting government business abroad has long been
recognized as the personal representative of his head of
state and has been treated with the respect and dignity such
position would require. Simple courtesies extended between
nations included personal immunity from arrest or detention
of the diplomat and his family and staff/ inviolability of
the mission/ and protection of diplomatic pouches. In many
cases these privileges were accepted as traditional or as
unwritten agreements between civilized nations. The Vienna
Convention was the culmination of efforts to formalize the
agreements and gain worldwide acceptance of the rules for
diplomatic relations.
The political structure of the world is constantly
changing/ causing instability in international agreements.
In fact/ many attempts to reach agreements between nations
have failed. For example/ the League of Nations and the
Treaty of Versailles in the inter-war years were failures
because of the mistrust among the participants. These
failures were important factors in the beginning of World
War II. The tendency toward failure holds true in most
14
cases except when discussing diplomatic relations.
Theoretically at least, nations have always extended certain
privileges to representatives of other governments. It is
understood that the head of state is not capable of
conducting all matters of business personally and that he
appoints representatives with certain powers and authority
to act for him particularly in routine matters with other
governments. Because of this practice three theories were
born which apply to diplomatic relations. The theories are
personal representation, exterritoriality, and functional
necessity. [Ref. 4]
Personal representation, as just discussed, simply means
that the diplomat is the personification of the ruler of his
sovereign state and should be granted the same respect due
the ruler [Ref. 4: p. 2]. The theory of personal represen-
tation can be found in practice in many ancient civilized
societies such as the Greek and Roman Empires. Exterri-
toriality is the theory that a mission established on
foreign soil becomes a part of the sovereign nation
represented. This theory has less support but in modified
terms it may still be accepted [Ref. 4: p. 7]. The
functional necessity theory is the basis for most of the
rules adopted by the Vienna Convention. This theory states
that a diplomat must have some degree of immunity and
protection in order to efficiently accomplish his tasks
[Ref. 4: p. 17].
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The changes in the political structure of the world
throughout the centuries have caused numerous changes in
treaties and agreements. Although nations change and
governments rise and fall/ the basic nature of diplomatic
relations has remained constant. States that are
diametrically opposed in political theory and ideology
maintain relations and agreements unless they are involved
in direct conflict. At those times when nations break
diplomatic relations/ the breaks are generally temporary.
Strong diplomatic ties are recognized as a major factor in
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II. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS/ 1961
In 1961, representatives of eighty-one nations met in
Vienna to draft what is known as the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. The product of the convention was an
agreement on the issues of diplomatic processes, diplomatic
privileges and immunities, and definitions of diplomatic
relations. Prior to the convention, from 1956 to 1959, a
special draft of the proposed agreements prepared by a
Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission of
the United Nations circulated among member nations. The
governments were asked to review the proposal, recommend
changes, and make comments. After reviewing the comments,
the Commission sent a revised draft to participating nations
for further recommendations. The culmination of this
process was the conference held in Vienna in 1961. [Ref. 5]
The agreements reached at Vienna depend on two important
factors. First and most significant is that the strength of
the agreements is based on reciprocity. Each nation can
count on receiving the same treatment it gives. States
could be assured that nations ratifying the Convention would
afford the same protection to diplomats and missions as they
received. The second factor in the success of the
Convention is the fact that the rules had been accepted and
18
generally abided by for several hundred years. Although the
agreements were not written in one comprehensive document/
governments had been following them for a long time. The
Convention simply codified many long-standing and understood
rules of behavior [Ref. 5: pp. 2-3]. Ten years after its
introduction the Convention had been ratified by 112 states.
Several governments have come and gone in the last two
decades but nations which originally signed the Convention
have generally continued to operate by it. The general
consensus is that the Vienna Convention is a successful
worldwide venture.
A. THE BASIC AGREEMENTS
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations consists
of a preamble and fifty-three articles. It is a compre-
hensive arrangement of diplomatic laws which covers
practically every point on which there was a previous legal
rule or accepted practice.
The Preamble is especially important because it states a
central theme to the entire Convention which is, "that the
purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the
functions of diplomatic missions as representing States"
[Ref. 5: p. 5]. The purpose of the Convention was also
emphasized to be one of promoting the friendly relations and
maintaining world peace and security. Finally the Preamble
19
points out that any situation not covered should be governed
by customary international law [Ref. 5: p. 7]. A particu-
larly important article from the view point of terrorist
abuse is the following one.
1 . The Mission (Buildings and Grounds)
Article 22 of the Vienna Convention states/
"1. The premise of the mission shall be inviolable. The
agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except
with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take
all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of
its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and
other property thereon and the means of transport of the
mission shall be immune from search, requisition,
attachment or execution."
Article 30 of the Convention says,
"1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall
enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the
premises of the mission.
2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in
paragraph 3 of Article 31, his property, shall likewise
enjoy inviolability."
Articles 22 and 30 clearly define the inviolability
of the mission premises by the receiving State. The
buildings and grounds of the mission, including the
residence of a diplomatic agent, are immune from search or
from entry and the receiving State is responsible for the
safeguarding of the mission. Note that in 1980 the
government of Iran did not fulfill its obligation to protect
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the American Embassy nor in two cases in Lebanon in 1983 and
1984 did the government protect the U.S. missions. However,
Great Britain abided by the letter of the law in April, 1984
by not entering the premises of the Libyan People's Bureau
after someone from that mission killed a British citizen
though it is unclear who if anyone at the People's Bureau
enjoyed diplomatic status.
2 . The Diplomatic Bag
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 27 deal specifically
with the diplomatic bag or pouch stating,
"3. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.
4. The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must
bear visible marks of their character and may contain
only diplomatic documents or articles intended for
official use .
"
The potential for abuse or problems is greatest in
the area of diplomatic bags. Some nations interpret
paragraph 3 very strictly and do not use any method of
inspection of the bag. Some hold that x-rays or other means
of inspecting the bag without opening or detaining it are
allowed. Some nations now agree that if the receiving State
has reason to believe that the bag contains objectionable
materials they may request the representative of the sending
State to open the bag for inspection or may refuse its
entry. The ever present problem of reciprocity still




3. The People Assigned to the Mission
There are different degrees of privilege which are
granted to members of a mission/ for example, full immunity
for diplomatic agents, partial immunity for some staff
members, and no immunity for general service (janitors,
maids, etc.) personnel. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 27,
and Articles 29, 31, 32, and 37 specify some of the
privileges granted to diplomats and their families as
follows
,
"5. The diplomatic courier, who shall be provided with an
official document indicating his status and the number of
packages constituting the diplomatic bag, shall be
protected by the receiving State in the performance of
his functions. He shall enjoy personal inviolability and
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
6. The sending State or the mission may designate
diplomatic couriers ad hoc. In such cases the provisions
of paragraph 5 of this article shall also apply, except
that the immunities therein mentioned shall cease to
apply when such a courier has delivered to the consignee
the diplomatic bag in his charge."
Article 29.
"The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and
shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on
his person, freedom, or dignity."
Article 31.
"1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable
property situtated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State
for the purposes of the mission;
22
(b) an action relating to succession in which the
diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator/
heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of
the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving State outside his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as
a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a
diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) , and (c) of paragraph 1 of this
Article/ and provided that the measures concerned can be
taken without infringing the inviolability of his person
or of his residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the
jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him
from the jurisdiction of the sending State."
Subparagraph 1 of Article 31 may seem contradictory
but the basic idea is that a diplomat is immune from civil
and administrative jurisdiction except in cases where he
enters into contractual agreements or commercial activities




"1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents
and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be
waived by the sending State.
2. Waiver must always be express.
3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or
by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under
Article 37 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from
jurisdiction in respect of any counter-claim directly
connected with the principal claim.
4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of
civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to
23
imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of




"1. The members of the family of a diplomatic agent
forming part of his household shall/ if they are not
nationals of the receiving State/ enjoy the privileges and
immunities specified in Articles 29 to 36."
B. STATES' RESPONSIBILITIES
The immunities and privileges granted to diplomats are
important and it is easy to see the difficulties involved in
diplomatic relations if there were no such agreements. An
important note is that the articles stated above are open to
abuse. These articles/ however/ only reflect the specific
privileges granted to diplomats and the protection of the
mission. There are articles which prescribe the duties of
States to cooperate with the intent of the agreements and
obligate the persons enjoying diplomatic privilege to
fulfill their duty to respect the receiving State's law and
not to take advantage of their status for personal gain or
to interfere in the internal affairs of the receiving State.
There are also specific courses of action that nations may
take if they feel the Articles of the Convention have been
violated. These range from declaring the diplomatic agent
"persona non grata" (basically/ no longer welcome) to
breaking diplomatic relations.
24
C. VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
In addition to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a convention for consular relations was held in
1963. The Convention on Consular Relations in contrast to
the Convention on Diplomatic Relations governed members
staffing consulates throughout the world rather than
embassies. There are many immunities and privileges granted
to members of consulates but not nearly of the scope of
diplomatic privileges. In most cases, privileges only apply
to members in direct performance of their consular duties
and generally do not include immunity from criminal
prosecution for alleged felonies. The exceptions granted in
the United States are to consular employees of the Soviet
Union, Poland, and Hungary with whom our government has
specific bilateral agreements which entitle those persons
significantly greater privileges.
The important article of immunity for consulates which
is the same as for embassies is that of inviolability of the
premises. Consulates are held to be inviolable to search or
entry in the same manner as embassies. Receiving states may
not enter the premises without permission of the sending
state. [Ref. 6]
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II I . CASES OF ABUSE: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The need for diplomatic privilege and immunity is
obvious, but the potential for abuse is great and there is
evidence that the misuse of those privileges and deviations
from the original intent of the Vienna Convention is an
increasing problem. Some of the problems are relatively
minor, such as states using their embassies to protect or
transport non-diplomatic personnel or using the diplomatic
pouch to transport goods and materials other than those
needed for the operation of the mission. Documented cases
report the use of diplomatic bags for such items as shirts
being sent to the home state for laundering, canned foods
which are not available being brought in, and jewels and
watches bought cheaply and smuggled for sale at substantial
personal profit. These abuses are neither a threat to
national security nor liable to lead to significant increase
in criminal activities. There are also cases of abuse,
however, which are more serious and detrimental to good
diplomatic relations. In 1961 and 1964, Latin American
diplomats were caught smuggling heroin into the United
States [Ref. 7]. In 1958, officials in Lebanon searched an
automobile driven by a Belgian diplomat to Syria and found
33 submachine guns, 28 pistols, 32 revolvers, 16 hand
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grenades/ 1800 rounds of machine gun ammunition, 1500 rounds
of other ammunition/ several time bombs, and some demolition
equipment [Ref. 8]. These weapons were significantly more
than he would need for personal protection or even for use
in his embassy. Recently the abuse of diplomatic privileges
and immunities has been more widely publicized. Three cases
specifically point out the potential for serious problems:
the killing of a British policewoman and kidnapping of a
Nigerian exile in London/ and the assassination attempt on
Pope John Paul II in Rome. Each of these cases was a
specific criminal act/ dangerous because of the potential to
cause or escalate problems among states. For purposes of
this thesis/ however/ only the factor of abusing diplomatic
privilege is important. Each of the incidents involved at
least one abuse of the Vienna Convention.
Another concern in the problem of violation of the
international agreements associated with diplomatic immunity
is that some practices have become routine and are now
generally condoned and accepted. Included is assigning
trained intelligence personnel to diplomatic posts with the
mission of covert intelligence collection. Such personnel
violate at least the intent of the Convention and the
designed mission of embassies and consulates.
B. GREAT BRITAIN
The government of Great Britain has had recently more
than its share of problems with terrorism. The Irish
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Republican Army is mora than a thorn in the side of the
British. For all practical purposes a war is going on in
Northern Ireland. The IRA is not just a small band of
terrorists occasionally causing a stir with some isolated
acts of violence but rather a well organized and massively
supported group of political revolutionaries. In addition
to the problems caused by the IRA, Great Britain has
recently been the focus of worldwide attention for two new
terrorist-type events involving the governments of Libya and
Nigeria. Both incidents are to date the most blatant,
proven abuses of diplomatic privilege and immunity; criminal
acts were carried out involving diplomatic personnel and/or
embassies. Such an assertion is based neither on specula-
tion nor circumstantial evidence but rather "smoking gun"
proof. The governments involved were caught in the act.
1 . Libyan People's Bureau, April 1984
On April 17, 1984, a group of seventy Libyan
citizens gathered outside of the Libyan People's Bureau
(Libya's title for its embassies). Its purpose was to hold
a peaceful demonstration against the policies and practices
of Libya's radical leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Most of
the demonstrators wore masks to hide their identities
because of the fear of repercussions against themselves and
their families by the Libyan government. Colonel Qaddafi
stated publicly that he would search out and destroy
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dissidents and exiles who protested against Libya. London
police officers were on the scene of the demonstration to
ensure that the protest remained peaceful and to maintain
order. They were also there to protect the demonstrators.
The government of Libya requested that the British not allow
the demonstration and warned of possible problems if the
demonstration did take place.
Suddenly the sound of gunfire rang throughout St.
James Square and one police officer and eleven civilians lay
on the ground bleeding. Witnesses say, and evidence proves/
that the shots came from a window of the People's Bureau.
The police officer, a woman named Yvonne Fletcher, and the
wounded civilians were removed from the area and sent to
various places for treatment. Police began to clear the
area and soon had cordoned off the block, evacuated all
nearby buildings and began what turned out to be a long
waiting game between the police and the 20 to 30 suspected
persons inside the Libyan mission. Negotiations began
almost immediately between the two governments. Britain
demanded permission to enter the embassy, search the
premises, and question the people inside. Libya flatly
refused, claiming the tenets of the Vienna Convention
granting inviolability of the embassy and immunity for the
diplomatic personnel. Adding to the problem was the fact
that the British did not know who was inside the building
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and who had diplomatic immunity because the Libyans had
failed to properly certify the diplomats assigned with the
British government as required by the Vienna Convention.
The Libyans later denied that their personnel were involved
and charged that the British and Libyan dissidents had
conspired to stage the incident in order to embarrass Libya
and to break diplomatic rules and enter the Libyan People's
Bureau. [Ref. 9]
Shortly after the shooting/ Officer Fletcher died
from her wounds during surgery. The situation became more
intense and the British were outraged. The night before the
shooting a communication from Libya to the mission was
intercepted, but it was not decoded until after the
incident. The communication, which instructed the members
of the mission to defend themselves and use their weapons to
eliminate demonstrators, was released to the public and
further exacerbated the problem. Tying the hands of the
British government was the fact that its embassy in Tripoli
had been surrounded by Libyans and fear of reprisals against
its personnel was real. There were also approximately
8000 British citizens in Libya who could not be protected.
[Ref. 10]
There was a standoff between the police surrounding
the embassy and the persons inside while tense negotiations
took place between the two governments. The final result
30
after nine days of talks was that British severed relations
with Libya, ordered the mission closed and the personnel
expelled. The reciprocal closing of missions took place
without serious incident. The British stood by and watched
passively as 30 people walked out of the Libyan mission in
groups of five and into waiting police vans which trans-
ported them to Heathrow Airport. From there they boarded a
plane which took them to Tripoli. Also on the plane were 18
bags sealed as diplomatic pouches. The British government
agreed not to interfere with the people or the bags as they
left the country. Among the 30 people/ the person who
killed Fletcher walked to his freedom and in one of the bags
the automatic weapon he used was probably hidden. Just
before leaving/ the Libyans requested permission to make one
last visit to London's banks and stores. Permission was
denied. The person or persons who fired the shots that
killed a British citizen left the country without any form
of punishment. Subsequent examination of the premises of
the People's Bureau did produce evidence which proved that
an automatic weapon had been fired from the embassy and it
was of a caliber and type that matched the weapon that
killed Fletcher. [Ref. 11]
2. Nigerian Exile/ July 1984
Less than three months after the incident at the
Libyan embassy/ another situation occurred in London in
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which the rules of the Vienna Convention were broken and the
privilege of the diplomatic bag was abused. A customs
official at Stansted Airport was suspicious of two crates
which were being loaded onto an aircraft for a flight to
Nigeria. The crates were marked as diplomatic pouches with
seals from the Nigerian Embassy. There was also a courier
accompanying the crates. The problem began when the officer
noted that the crates were improperly marked and on further
examination found that the courier did not have proper
documentation of his authorization as a diplomatic courier.
The crates were ordered opened in the presence of an
official from the Nigerian Embassy. Inside the crates were
four men, one of whom was Umaru Dikko, an exile from
Nigeria. Dikko had been a powerful figure under his
brother-in-law, the President of Nigeria, before a military
coup ousted the existing government and took control. Dikko
fled to London and took up residence there in a very
expensive fashion. The new military government charged that
Dikko had embezzled millions of dollars from the nation and
wanted him returned to Nigeria for trial. Normal methods
for effecting extradition were not utilized but rather
mercenaries were hired to help kidnap and bring Dikko back
to stand trial. The other three men inside the crate were
Israelis, one an anesthesiologist who administered drugs to
keep Dikko unconscious during the trip. The Israeli
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government denied involvement in the kidnapping. Subsequent
evidence proved that the Israeli government was not
involved. The Israelis arrested were simply mercenaries
with no official connection to Israel.
Several other people were intially arrested,
questioned and released. The other man charged with the
kidnapping was a Nigerian diplomat from Lagos but he was not
certified in London and so did not qualify for immunity
under the Vienna Convention. Other members of the Nigerian
Embassy refused to waive their immunity and answer questions
concerning the case. At the time of the discovery, several
cars from the Nigerian Embassy were at the airport with a
number of diplomats. [Ref. 12]
Again after tense negotiations, the governments made
no significant progress and diplomatic relations were
strained. British officials finally expelled two high rank-
ing diplomats and informed the Nigerian High Commissioner
(ambassador), who was in Lagos conferring with his govern-
ment, that he was no longer welcome in Great Britain. This
move was reciprocated by Nigeria and fell just short of a
total break in formal relations. Once again diplomats who
were directly implicated in a major felony escaped punish-
ment by way of diplomatic immunity [Ref. 13]. Currently the
two governments maintain relations but the diplomats who
were expelled have not been replaced.
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In January 1985/ the government of Nigeria filed
formal papers requesting extradition of Dikko. In
commenting on the request a radio report from Lagos said
that/ "the ball was now in the British court/" and that the
request was "an opportunity for Britain to restore and
restrengthen relations between her and Nigeria" [Ref. 14].
The request for Dikko's extradition was denied.
B. ITALY
Italy is another nation plagued by terrorism. The
Italian Red Brigades comprise internationally known
terrorist groups which have claimed responsibility or have
been charged with hundreds of terrorist acts since they were
first identified in the 1960's. The Red Brigades gained
international attention in recent years after a period of
relative calm by the kidnapping and assassination of Italy's
leader of the Christian Democrat Party/ Aldo Moro, in 1978
[Ref. 15], and the kidnapping of United States Army
Brigadier General James Dozier in 1981. Italy has also been
the scene of many other terrorist activities sometimes
acting as a battleground for opposing groups such as the
Palestine Liberation Organization and the state of Israel.
Few other acts, though/ have caused as much of a stir as th
attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981. This
attempt was definitely a political/ terrorist attack but it
was also a major conspiracy involving at least four nations
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Continuing investigations prove that a conspiracy exists.
All the evidence discovered has not been released as of
January 1985.
1 . Assassination Attempt on Pope John Paul II,
May 1981
In the early evening of May 13/ 1981, Pope John Paul
II was finishing a normal tour of St. Peter's Square in his
white jeep, shaking hands and waving to thousands of
onlookers. At 5:17 P.M. several shots (witnesses reported
hearing from 2 to 5 shots) were heard and the Pope suddenly
slumped over in his jeep with blood showing on his white
robes. He was rushed to a nearby Catholic hospital while
the crowds and police subdued a young Turkish man who had a
Browning 9-mm semiautomatic pistol in his possession. The
man was soon identified as Mehmet Ali Agca , 23, an escaped
convict from a prison in Istanbul where he had been serving
a life sentence for murdering a Turkish newspaper editor in
1979. All evidence indicated that Agca acted alone in his
attempt on the pontiff [Ref. 16]. Speculation abounded as
to whether he was a religious fanatic, a political terrorist
or simply a "crazy" attempting to gain international
notoriety.
Agca confessed to the crime and stated several times
that he acted alone. He was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Case closed? Not quite. Several months
after beginning his prison term, Agca began indicating that
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he wanted to change his confession. For the next three
years Agca told a story of an international conspiracy in
the plot to kill the Pope. An Italian judge was assigned to
investigate the case further. The revelations of the
confession of Agca and the corroborating evidence discovered
by the judge were astonishing. Agca told an intriguing tale
of international travel/ terrorist training camps and a plot
to kill John Paul by the Bulgarian secret police. He was
hired by the Bulgarians as a professional hit man and
arrangements for the shooting and his escape were made by at
least three Bulgarian citizens in Rome/ two of whom were
diplomats assigned to the embassy in Rome. [Ref. 17]
During the 18 months between Agca ' s escape from
prison and the assassination attempt on the Pope, he
traveled extensively throughout Europe. Agca went on an
apparent extended vacation spending as much as fifty
thousand dollars during his travels. Most important to this
time is the fact that he spent 50 days in Bulgaria/ in spite
of the Bulgarian law that allows Turks to remain in their
country for only 30 hours without special permission. The
Bulgarians denied any knowledge of Agca ' s claim that he was
in Bulgaria for that amount of time, even though the
Bulgarian secret police are noted for their efficient
methods of knowing most things that take place in their
country. During his stay in Sofia, the Bulgarian capital,
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Agca claims to have met several members of the Turkish
mafia. It was in Sofia also that he bought the pistol he
used in the attack and obtained his counterfeit passport
which allowed him freedom to travel [Ref. 17: p. 140].
After leaving Sofia/ Agca also visited Yugoslavia, France,
Switzerland, Tunisia, Spain, and Austria. He made several
visits to Italy and Sicily, too, stopping in Palermo, Milan,
Perugia, and Rome [Ref. 18]. These were not the travels of
an insane, poor Turk.
Agca ' s version of the plot was that the Bulgarian
agents had made his living arrangements in Rome, gone
through rehearsals of the assassination with him, brought
him to St. Peter's Square the day of the attack, and were to
have provided his means of escape via diplomatic vehicles
from the embassy. (Some evidence and speculation indicate
that in actuality other conspirators were to kill Agca to
cover the plot after he shot the Pope.)
The significant fact in this case, without going
into great detail, is that a government was involved in the
assassination attempt of another head of state, using its
embassy and diplomatic personnel as active participants in
the plot. The Bulgarians also went to great lengths to
cover the trail and make the assassination appear to be the
work of a lone gunman. (For further study on the
conspiracy, I recommend The Time of the Assassins by Claire
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Italian authorities arrested one Bulgarian, Sergei
Ivanov Antonov, who had been head of the state airline in
Rome, but again the diplomats involved escaped prosecution.
Both had returned to Bulgaria, one on "leave", the other at
the normal end of tour", before warrants were issued for
their arrests. Both refused to return to Italy and also
claimed immunity from prosecution and questioning [Ref. 19].
Another major crime was committed and at least two of the
perpetrators, who abused privileges and operating guidelines
of an embassy, were never punished.
C. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a more
general example which illustrates the abuses of diplomatic
privileges and state support of terrorism. The PLO is a
bold group of revolutionaries operating mainly against the
nation of Israel. In fighting for a new Palestinian State,
the PLO has conducted acts of terror against Israel and
Israeli citizens worldwide. It has gained international
notoriety and not a little support for its cause. Most of
its support, directly and indirectly, in a theoretical sense
(i.e., sympathetic to its goals) comes from Middle Eastern
nations and states from North Africa. In a more practical
manner, the PLO receives support from the Soviet Union and
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its satellites in the form of money, arms, and refuge.
Soviet support is not given because the Soviets believe in
an autonomous or independent Palestine but rather for the
advantage they can gain in the region by the destabilizing
effect of terrorism and war and the eventual collapse of the
Israeli government.
There is overwhelming evidence of support by the Soviet
Union for the PLO other than obvious things such as Yasser
Arafat, head of the PLO, being a regular visitor to Soviet
embassies. He has been granted status as head of state and
is a regular visitor to Moscow as well. Thanks to a
successful raid of PLO headquarters in Beirut by Israeli
military forces, reams of documents were discovered which
proved that the Soviets support Arafat and his organization
extensively. The papers discovered included records of
training of terrorists by Soviet military personnel. Also
found were recorded discussions between top persons in the
PLO with leaders of the Soviet Union concerning financing,
arms, training, and targets. [Ref. 20]
The Soviet Union recognizes the PLO as a legitimate
nation fighting a war of national liberation. As such the
Palestinians have been recognized as "patriots in defense of
a legitimate right to return to their native land" [Ref. 20:
p. 33]. Since 1974 the official status of the PLO has
increased in the Soviet Union to the point of opening an
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office in Moscow which was granted embassy status in 1981.
The leaders of the two governments have regular meetings and
high ranking PLO personnel are regular visitors to Soviet
embassies and consulates throughout the Middle East [Ref.
20: pp. 34-35], In addition to providing arms openly to the
Palestinians/ the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Cyprus have
a key role in smuggling weapons to the PLO and diplomatic
fronts are used to deliver intelligence information to the
PLO for targeting purposes [Ref. 20: pp. 50-52]. The
Soviets openly and unashamedly provide arms and other
support to the PLO and yet still abuse the privileges and
immunities of their embassies by covertly supporting the PLO
terrorists. The implications of this practice are serious
for causing future problems.
D. PERSONNEL PRACTICES
The original intent for opening embassies and consulates
and maintaining diplomatic relations among nations was to
foster goodwill and provide a means for conducting talks and
negotiations in all areas of relations including economics/
military support and treaties/ and technical research.
Embassies and consulates have also grown to be intercessors
for their citizens who may have problems while visiting
foreign countries and the missions have become public
relations firms advertising their nations and promoting
their culture. The people assigned to diplomatic missions
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have numerous tasks but the most important ones come under
the heading of official business concerning relations
between states and reporting to the leaders of their states
items of importance concerning those relations [Ref. 21].
Most states also assign military attaches to their missions
as advisors in military matters. Everyone assigned to a
mission will naturally acquire information of importance to
his own state through observing open media/ talking with
local citizens and observing daily activities in the country
to which he is assigned. Passing such information on to
supervisors is not unethical nor is it an abuse of
privileges and immunities granted to diplomats. The
apparent trend, however, is to assign persons to missions
with the specific task of intelligence collection.
The Soviet Union routinely assigns highly trained agents
of the KGB (Soviet Intelligence Service) to its missions
with the specific goal of covert intelligence collection.
Also, every person assigned to a Soviet embassy or consulate
receives some training from the KGB in intelligence
collection methods. This practice applies to embassies and
consulates of Soviet controlled nations as well. The
Soviets also use their embassies as command posts for their
KGB agents involved in terrorist activities [Ref. 22]. As
discussed earlier, Soviet agents provide intelligence
information to members of the PLO and other groups through
their embassies and consulates around the world.
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The practice of making embassies and consulates
intelligence collection centers or warehouses for weapons
deliveries is a dangerous one and assigning personnel to
those missions whose primary job is espionage negates the
intent and the specifications of the Vienna Convention.
Continuing in this manner will jeopardize true diplomatic
relations and destabilize an already fragile international
political order. It is important for governments to allow
diplomats to talk and find other methods for spying.
Over 2/000 Soviet agents/ many in diplomatic positions/
from various nations have been discovered and/or expelled in
the last several years for charges directly related to
espionage [Ref. 22: pp. 509-561]. The number of cases
indicates that this is not an accident or coincidence/ but




IV. COUNTERING THE ABUSES
It is evident that abuses of diplomatic privilege and
immunity have taken place and the potential exists for
further abuse. It is important to examine that potential
and try to determine also if the abuses will increase.
After determining that a serious problem exists and may very
likely get worse/ someone must formulate measures to combat
the problem. No one can accurately predict the future but
an examination of the historical evidence should indicate
that the probability is high that the problem of abusing
diplomatic privilege will increase if allowed to continue
unchecked
.
The question of what can be done to stop the abuses is
difficult to answer. The solutions must involve most
nations of the world in cooperation with each other.
Typical answers are to enforce current agreements or to
change those agreements to close loopholes and stop abuses.
Such answers sound easy enough/ but history shows that
international agreements take years to formulate and even
more years to ratify. After this process is complete/
arguments usually arise concerning definitions and
applications of specific articles of the agreements. The
most difficult thing to accomplish in any international
venture is cooperation among nations. Ideological and
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political differences between peoples almost always negates
a real system of cooperation. The nature of man forces him
to vie for the position of greatest advantage.
A. POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED ABUSES
The previous chapter presented evidence that proved that
diplomatic privileges and immunities were abused or that the
intent of the Vienna Convention was circumvented. Many
people will argue that the specific cases of abuse were
merely isolated incidents carried out by a small minority of
governments and diplomatic personnel. Those same people
will further argue that there is no "smoking gun" (i.e.,
catching a perpetrator in the act) evidence in the other
cases, merely circumstantial evidence or unfounded
allegations. The questions that are not addressed by those
who fail to perceive a problem are: how many political
figures have vanished or died mysteriously without any
evidence as to the perpetrators? How many weapons have been
supplied by diplomatic pouch to terrorists or those who
would attempt to overthrow legitimate governments? What
covert activities are continuing under the guise of
diplomatic operations in various countries? Is it not
possible that the relatively few cases that were brought to
the attention of the public are only the tip of the iceberg
and in reality serious crimes are being committed on a
regular basis involving the abuse of diplomatic privilege?
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It is possible that the primary means of transporting
weapons to terrorist bands is the diplomatic pouch and the
safe haven for assassins is the embassy--inviolable by the
receiving state. It is also possible and probable that
states that support or direct terrorism will continue to use
their embassies as a covert means of the support.
The scope of the problem is tremendous and a few data
and some not unreasonable hypothetical examples can be used
to illustrate this. In the United States alone there are
approximately 1,500 embassies and consulates in operation,
not including missions to the United Nations in New York,
and other international organizations which are granted some
diplomatic or consular status (i.e., Organization of
American States, International Monetary Fund offices, etc.).
The United States currently maintains diplomatic relations
with 148 nations and the government grants full immunity to
approximately 20,000 people including ambassadors, staffs,
and families [Ref. 23]. (This figure does not include
employees of consulates or the special missions listed
above.) This means that potentially 20,000 persons could
commit crimes in this country and not be punished.
Obviously, of the 20,000 foreign nationals serving their
governments in the United States only a handful, if any,
would be involved in criminal or even questionable
activities just as the representatives of American serving
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abroad are honorable/ hardworking people carrying out their
assigned duties and nothing more. The 1/500 embassies and
consulates are real potential hiding places for criminals
avoiding detection or arrest by U.S. authorities/ though it
is unlikely that they are used as such. These figures and
arguments are not quoted to scare anyone or to "cry wolf"
but simply to show the possibilities for problems.
There are several ways that privileges could be abused
to commit crimes. There are purely criminal acts against
persons or property such as robbery/ rape/ assault/ or
homicide and there are acts of politically inspired violence
and terrorism. Important to this study are those acts which
can be defined as terrorism. The following hypothetical
cases will further examine the potential problem with
scenarios which are possible and though they are criminal
acts, they would fall under the definition of terrorism
because of the political motivation. (It is important to
note that these are purely hypothetical examples. It is not
my intent to accuse or make any allegation against any
state . )
(1) In Los Angeles an outbreak of violence against
Turkish citizens and property including consular employees
takes place in the course of a month which leaves seven
Turks dead, eighteen injured and thousands of dollars of
property damage including damage to the Turkish Consulate
in Los Angeles and destruction of two consular vehicles.
Armenian terrorists claim responsibility and promise to
continue the attacks to avenge the injustice of the
Turkish government against Armenians and to publicize
their cause.
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In Istanbul, government officials decide that they
have had enough and decide to retaliate in kind and with
force sufficient to eradicate the problem, either by
eliminating all the terrorists or by creating such an
atmosphere of fear as to deter future incidents. Three
men are sent to the Turkish Embassy in Washington D.C.
They are high-ranking officials will full diplomatic
status whose mission is to go on an inspection tour of the
nine Turkish Consulates throughout the United States.
Upon arrival at the consulate in Los Angeles the three
"diplomats" are given a list of twenty suspected Armenian
terrorists. Within a week twenty people are dead and
several more injured in violent attacks throughout Los
Angeles. Subsequent local police investigations turn up
little evidence except that the weapons used were
sophisticated automatic types and all of the people killed
were American citizens. Some of the victims had some
minor connections to terrorist activities but no
significant proof. After completing their inspection tour
in Los Angeles the three Turks go to Houston, Texas to
visit the consulate there and then back to Washington D.C.
for a few days before they return to Turkey.
(2) The Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington D.C.
receives two crates with diplomatic seals from its
government. A few days later two men of Middle Eastern
appearance visit the Czechoslovakian mission for about two
hours. When they leave, their limousine has two crates in
its trunk. Approximately one week later the Defense
Minister of Israel arrives at National Airport in
Washington D.C. for a visit with the U.S. Department of
State. The Israeli Ambassador to the United States meets
his visiting minister at the airport and the two leave for
the embassy in the Ambassador's limousine. As the car
travels along Interstate 395 into the city it suddenly
explodes killing the driver and both statesmen inside.
The force of the blast also causes two other cars on the
highway to crash killing one American and seriously
injuring three others. Investigations of the explosion
reveal that a Soviet-made rocket propelled grenade (RPG-7)
was probably used in the attack but there is no trace to
the source or the perpetrators.
(3) A conservative U.S. Congressman from Tennessee was a
strong anti-communist spokesman and was continuously
stirring the fight against the Soviet Union and its
puppets. He had often proposed legislation to oppose
support of any form to the Soviets or any organization in
the United States which had ties to the USSR, the Eastern
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Bloc/ or to Communism. The Congressman had in recent
months seen a marked increase in support for his ideas and
programs nationwide. Unfortunately/ the Congressman and
his wife were shot to death, apparently the result of an
attempted burglary in their home outside Chattanooga. A
neighbor who thought he heard gunshots noticed a strange
car leaving the area that night and, in fact, wrote down
the number of the Georgia license plate. The number was
traced to an automobile rental agency at the Atlanta
airport. Further investigation revealed that the car had
been rented to a man identified by his passport and
international driver's license as a West German
businessman. All attempts to trace the man were futile as
the government of Germany had no records of such a person.
Meanwhile, at the Polish Consulate in Atlanta, a man threw
a fake West German passport and driver's license into the
fireplace, finished packing his small suitcase and left
for the airport for his flight to Warsaw.
The above scenes sound like they come from cheap spy
novels but in fact the possibility exists that they could
happen here though the probability is very low. The point
is, very simply, that the growth of abuses of diplomatic
privileges and immunities will very likely lead to
situations like these. Embassies and consulates of some
states are becoming command centers for the continuing
terrorist wars.
B. CORRECTIVE MEASURES
Recognizing a problem and admitting that it exists is
the first step in solving that problem. The problem of
abusing diplomatic privileges does exist and decisive action
is required to prevent the problem from growing and to
eradicate it. There are four fundamental ways of getting
rid of the abuses of diplomatic privileges. They are:
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(1) eliminate all agreements and diplomatic relations;
(2) rescind all immunities; (3) enforce current agreements;
or (4) change the agreements.
The first— to eliminate all agreements and diplomatic
relations— is the most radical and probably the most
unrealistic. The necessity for constant access between
states is well established and the problem of closing all
embassies and consulates is greater than the problem of
abusing the privileges granted those missions. Since men,
and hence governments/ can not by nature coexist peaceably,
there must be a means of continuing negotiations and talks
to keep small disagreements from becoming major wars.
Embassies and consulates also serve other functions such as
supporting their citizens who are visiting foreign lands.
Closing embassies and consulates would require states to
send representatives back and forth every time a crisis
arose, wasting time and resources and decreasing efficiency.
Rescinding all immunities is also not an effective way
to solve the problem. Diplomats have important functions to
perform and the time wasted and problems arising from
official or unofficial harassment of these diplomats is also
a greater problem than that of abusing the system. If a
member of a mission to a foreign state spends all of his
time answering questions or giving account of his actions in
response to fabricated allegations, he will not be able to
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do his job and the mission may as well be closed. The
logical conclusion follows that to solve the problem either
enforce the current agreements already codified or change
those agreements.
1 . Enforce Current Agreements
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (and
the Convention on Consular Relations) was the culmination of
tremendous efforts to create specific international
regulations governing the conduct of states in diplomatic
relations. The intent of the Convention was to simplify and
codify accepted practices. One reason for the rules was to
make it easier for nations to work together and negotiate
problems. Talking is better than fighting over every minor
disagreement. The articles also make it easier for the
diplomats to accomplish their tasks. The solution to the
problem of abuse of diplomatic privilege that sounds simple/
is for the world to enforce the agreements. Every nation
should examine its policies and practices and alter them as
necessary to fall within the limits established by the
Convention. There are some minor definitional problems but
every government which has signed and agreed to the
Convention should understand the basic intent and could/ if
it wanted, follow the articles in such a way that no one
could question its motives.
The Preamble to the Vienna Convention specifically
defines the intent of the articles and there are articles
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which state the reason for the convention/ the responsi-
bilities of states to adhere to the articles and means of
redress if violation occur. The only way to ensure complete
adherence to the Vienna Convention without making any
changes is through international cooperation,
a. International Cooperation
The term international cooperation brings to
mind many Utopian ideas such as world peace, complete trust
and brotherly love. With a system of complete international
cooperation including those Utopian ideas there would be no
need for a Vienna Convention. Since all states would trust
each other and be content with their lot there would not be
any problems. We would all be citizens of the world and the
negotiations between nations would be open and honest and
diplomats would have no need for protection and immunities.
Complete international cooperation is indeed a
Utopian aspiration. The nature of man will never allow such
a cooperation to occur. There is a possibility, however, of
a system of semi-cooperation (i.e., effective cooperation in
specific areas). In the case of diplomatic relations it is
possible for the nations of the world to cooperate by
agreeing to abide by the letter of the law of the Vienna
Convention and by establishing and accepting an impartial
judicial system to hear cases of transgressions. This
judiciary would necessarily be empowered to impose sanctions
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upon offenders. It is important that such a judiciary be
more effective than the current World Court. The World
Court has no power to enforce its decisions as nations are
allowed simply to refuse to abide by those decisions. One
possibility is a court which would try the diplomats accused
of abusing privileges. The diplomats would keep their
immunity while serving in foreign nations which would
minimize the problem of harassment, but the receiving state
would have a more stringent way of protecting itself against
abuses of diplomatic privilege. The court would have to
have some way of punishing those persons found guilty. A
neutral prison would have to be established or a system of
monetary fines created. A person found guilty would also
never be eligible for diplomatic status again. It is
important to establish some way to enforce the current
Convention or it will not be as effective as it could be.
The only viable alternative is to change the agreements.
Enforcing the Vienna Convention is not easy and
establishing an impartial judiciary would be extremely
difficult. A major consideration would be the time involved
to implement such a system given the nature of international
negotiations. Also important is the necessity for a system
of checks and balances within the postulated judiciary to
prevent this additional system from becoming abused. An
example of check and balance would be the organization of
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the court to take account of ideologically motivated
judgements by West- and East- bloc judges. Check and
balance would be through the establishment of equal numbers
of bloc judges and the conscious addition of at least three
judges from countries not aligned with either East or West.
The judiciary and the checks and balances within it would be
difficult to establish and implement but necessary if inter-
national cooperation were going to work through effective
functioning of the Vienna Convention.
2. Change the Agreements
Changing the agreements of the Vienna Convention is
not a new idea. In fact/ but not surprisingly, a recent
demand for changes in the current agreements has come from
the government of Bulgaria, a puppet of the Soviet Union,
which has been implicated in a very serious abuse of
diplomatic status [Ref. 24]. The Bulgarians want specific
changes in the rules governing the diplomatic bag making it
more difficult for states to abuse the privilege of the bag,
but most western governments oppose any such changes. Most
governments do not want the diplomatic bag detained or
inspected in any way because, quite frankly, they are
sending equipment and supplies to their embassies that they
would rather not have publicized. The equipment is not
necessarily an abuse of the privilege but rather an accepted
means of transporting communications equipment and similar
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items which the sending states prefer remain anonymous and
protected. The Bulgarian request for changing the articles
concerning the immunity of the diplomatic pouch would lessen
the protection of the pouch and allow states greater
discretion in inspecting/ detaining, or refusing entry of
the pouch. On the surface this request seems to be
detrimental to the use of the diplomatic bag. If the bag is
used for its designed purpose, however, no problem should
arise. The bag with a diplomatic seal is supposed to be
protected from interference by the receiving state but it is
not a conduit for transporting questionable items. If the
sending state is not willing to reveal the articles being
sent to its embassy, maybe it should not be sending them.
Changing the agreements is as hard or harder than
enforcing current rules. In order to change the Vienna
Convention another meeting would have to be convened to hear
the proposed changes, incorporate them into the existing
articles, send them to all signatory nations for inspection,
revision, and recommendations, and finally, after several
iterations of this process, send the revised final draft of
the new convention around the world for ratification. The
original Vienna Convention took several years to go into
effect, any changes would probably take more time and in the
end have little result. This is because after all the
negotiations for a proposed change the end result would
probably be no significant change at all.
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Two other possibilities exist for changing the
Vienna Convention. The first is to start over from scratch
and the other is to add articles to codify enforcements of
the agreements (i.e., allow specific sanctions against
offenders) and to establish some means of verifying
compliance without hindering the diplomatic mission. Both
of these solutions would also be very tedious and probably
not make an appreciable difference. In the first case, if
an attempt is made to start over and write a completely new
document, where would it start? The articles of the Vienna
Convention are basically good and any attempt to draft new
legislation would inevitably result in simply rewording the
existing articles. The time and effort to effect such a
change is not warranted. Adding more articles or amendments
to the Convention would be the same as trying to change
existing articles. A tremendous amount of time and effort
would probably be wasted. It would be, however, a step in
the right direction.
Shortly after the shooting incident in London in
April, 1984, the United States Senate considered a bill
making it a federal felony in the U.S. for a foreign
diplomat to use a firearm to commit a felony. The U.S.
State Department opposes the legislation because it
undercuts the absolute immunity of diplomats from criminal
prosecution and would allow reciprocal restrictions placed
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on our diplomats abroad [Ref. 25]. The fear of reciprocity/
considering the judicial systems of some nations which
exercise less than due process/ is a real threat to our
diplomatic agents overseas. In addition to the problem of
reciprocity the bill represents a potential challenge to the
Convention which could seriously undermine the basic good of
th agreements. The bill (S.2771) was not acted on before
the Congressional session ended in 1984 but there are plans
to reintroduce it during the next Congress with companion
legislation for a resolution to the President calling for a
request to amend the Vienna Convention (Appendices A and B).
This action may raise some more problems/ but it will also
send a message to the world that the United States does not
intend to sit idly by and let the abuses continue. The
State Department argument about the problem of reciprocity
is a valid one but probably not as serious as feared.
Senator Allen Specter (Republican/ Pennsylvania) stated in
his testimony before the Senate on the merits of S.2771 that
the slight risk that some country might fabricate charges
against American diplomats is worth taking. He further
argued that the amount of time needed to change the Vienna
Convention should not deter us from making the effort and
showing the world that we are serious [Ref. 26].
Changing the Vienna Convention is a difficult task
and probably an unproductive one/ but necessary. The intent
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of the Vienna Convention is to protect bona fide diplomats
from harassment or interference with their duties/ not a
sanction for criminal activity. Diplomats should not commit
crimes and if they do they should be punished.
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V. CONCLUSION
The study of international terrorism is a popular
activity today. There are many political groups that
practice terrorism. Terrorists have a wide spectrum of
weapons and tactics. A variety of psychological
characteristics make up the terrorist. A serious student of
terror can find an abundance of information ranging from an
historical analysis to the research on counter-terrorism
tactics. Making the connection between international
terrorism and diplomacy is a relatively new field of study.
There has been some mention of the problem by some good
authors of the subject (Ray Cline and Claire Sterling/ for
example)/ but not until the relatively recent events
directly attributable to abuse of diplomatic privilege has
there been any real concern over the problem. The U.S.
Department of State has begun to address the topic and is
investigating methods to combat the problem. However/ at
this time/ the official State line in this area is to
maintain the status quo. Acting legal advisor Dan McGovern
of the State Department said in his testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in July/ 1984, that the U.S.
should not enter into any attempts to change the Vienna
Convention unless the outcome is likely to be a net gain for
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the United States [Ref. 27]. Mr. McGovern also agreed with
the London Economic Summit in its Declaration on
International Terrorism issued June 9, 1984 in its three
proposals for addressing and combatting the problem of abuse
of diplomatic privilege. Those proposals were:
(1) Closer cooperation and coordination between police
and security organizations and other relevant authorities/
especially in the exchange of information/ intelligence,
and technical knowledge;
(2) Use of the powers of the receiving state under the
Vienna Convention in such matters as the size of
diplomatic missions/ and the number of buildings enjoying
diplomatic immunity;
(3) Consultation and as far as possible cooperation over
the expulsion from their countries of known terrorists/
including persons of diplomatic status involved in
terrorism. [Ref. 28]
Terrorism is not a dying fad, but a growing threat.
Secretary of State George Shultz called terrorism "a
contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes
untreated" [Ref. 29]. Decisive action is required if the
problem is to be eradicated. We probably will never totally
destroy the practice of terrorism but we can seriously
hamper the terrorists by taking away their weapons.
There are three fundamental ways in which diplomatic
privileges and immunities are being misused. They are
criminal/ political/ and personal. Another brief
examination of the factors that make up these three areas
may shed further light on the potential problem.
The least serious of the areas is that of personal
abuses. The cases discussed previously involved sending
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shirts to a laundry via diplomatic pouch or importing canned
foods which aren't available in the host country using the
diplomatic bag are examples. Such abuses are not serious
and in some cases are even comical, but they are abuses and
should be stopped.
Criminal acts associated with abuse of diplomatic
privilege are a more serious concern. The criminal acts
which involve abuse of diplomatic privilege can be
classified in two categories—violent or non-violent.
Violent crimes committed by persons enjoying diplomatic
immunity would include homicide, rape, or assault. An
example of this is the case of a Greek diplomat who punched
a San Francisco police officer when the officer gave him a
ticket for a traffic violation [Ref. 30]. Non-violent
crimes committed by diplomats include smuggling drugs,
jewels, gold, or counterfeit money. These crimes are
already a major concern of law enforcement agencies
worldwide. Exploiting diplomatic laws to commit such acts
aggravates the problem and counters the efforts to reduce
crime
.
The final area of concern in the abuse of diplomatic
agreements is political. The political misuse of privileges
and immunities may also be broken down into subsets. The
subsets are intelligence collection and support of
terrorism. The Soviet Union is the most conspicuous
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offender of using its embassies and consulates for
intelligence centers. The KGB operates from Soviet missions
worldwide and it is safe to assume that other states
practice the same abuse/ although probably not on so grand a
scale. The two incidents in London in 1984 and the attempt
to kill the Pope in 1981 are the best publicized incidents
of abusing diplomatic privilege through terrorist acts.
They are also among the most serious known incidents to
date .
It is easy to classify abuses of diplomatic privileges
and immunity into one of the fundamental areas noted above.
The problem is not new but it has taken on a more serious
complexion. Too many "minor" abuses have become commonplace
and are accepted or condoned. This had led to the growth of
the problem. We have buried our heads for a long time but
the danger has not gone away.
The purpose of this thesis is neither to employ scare
tactics nor to magnify the problem beyond its true scope but
to bring to light a serious problem with enormous potential
for becoming worse. The case for combatting diplomatic
abuse cannot be overstated. If one act of terrorism is
committed through the abuse of a diplomatic privilege or
immunity it is too many. We must not become complacent by
rationalizing away the problem with statistics that "prove"
that the problem is not significant. The fact that more
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Americans die each day in traffic accidents than in a year
of terrorist attacks is not germane. This is a problem that
can and must be solved; accidents will always happen, but
terrorism can at least be deterred.
It is imperative that embassies and consulates retain
their original designed functions and diplomats be allowed
to perform their diplomatic functions and those alone. The




SENATE BILL S.2 771
98th CONGRESS
2d Session S.2771
To protect the internal security of the f.'uited Suites against international terror
ism by making the use ol a firearm to commit a felonv by foreign diplomat;
in the Tinted States a Federal felony.
IN THE SENATE OF THE EXITED STATES
June 1.") (legislative day. .Junk 1 1). 108-4
Mr. Specter (lor himself and Mr. Denton) introduced the following bill; which
was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To protect the internal security of the Tinted States against
international terrorism by making the use of a firearm to
commit a felony by foreign diplomats in the United States a
Federal felony.
1 Be it enacted by I he Scna/t mid House o! Reprcipntu-
2 tires ol the L 'Ufed Sl-.i/f-1' <>\ Antci'tci-' m ''cmjn'ss ussfinbli'd,
3 That (a) (.'hapler 44 oi tiile !>. I'niu-il States Code, is
4 amend* d hv adding <ii ;i,e end ihereoi the following:
5 "§ J)'_'i). Foreiii'ii - 1 i [ > i < - ' • . ; ?
-
(5 "(a) fi shall i III; !,lie iiniau'liii lot'—
"(
I
*( A) .m i : ' • • ! 1 1 >< r o! ;i loreign diplomat ie mis-
siors ie i he i e ted .'"';,' !c.- em [\\n.\ ; o iimmmii • !'ro:ti i he
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21 criminal jurisdiction of the United States under the
2 provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
3 lations, done on April 18, 1961; or
4 "(B) any member of a foreign consular post in the
5 United States entitled to immunity from the criminal
6 jurisdiction of the United States under the provisions of
7 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done on
8 April 24, 1963,
9 to use a firearm to commit any act constituting a felony
10 under the criminal laws of the United States or any State.
1
1
"(b) Whoever violates this section shall be punishable by
12 a fine of $10,000 or by imprisonment for 10 years, or both.
13 "(c) For purposes of this section
—
14 "(1) the term "member of a foreign diplomatic
15 mission" includes any individual described by Article
16 1(b) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
17 tions, done on April 18, 1961; and
18 "(2) the term "member of a foreign consular
19 post" includes any individual described by Article Kg)
20 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done
21 on April 24, 1963.".
22 (b) The analysis lor chapter 44 of title 18 United States
23 Code is amended bv adding at I he end thereof the following:
"929. Foreign diplomats
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APPENDIX B
SENATE RESOLUTION S. RES. 3 95
98th CONGRESS
2d Session S. RES. 395
Urging the President to renegotiate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions to eliminate immunity for diplomats engaging in assaults with firearms
or explosives.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 6, 1984
Mr. Specter submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
RESOLUTION
Urging the President to renegotiate the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations to eliminate immunity for diplomats
engaging in assaults with firearms or explosives.
Whereas article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 1961 provides:
"A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state," thus granting absolute
and complete immunity for all crimes, including murder by
assassination;
Whereas this grant of full immunity was based on the assump-
tion that either accredited diplomats would not commit hei-
nous crimes or that, pursuant to article 37 which provides
"The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of
the receiving state does not exempt him from the jurisdic-
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2tion of the sending state," any diplomats committing such
crimes would be prosecuted by their own government;
Whereas the recent machinegunning by diplomats of Libya from
their London Embassy in which eleven dissident Libyan stu-
dents were injured and a British policewoman was killed,
reportedly on instructions radioed from Tripoli, began a new
era in the history of diplomacy and showed complete con-
tempt for human life and international law and proved that
the established assumptions about lawful behavior and home
government prosecution are no longer valid: Now, therefore,
be it
1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that in order
2 both to deter assassinations and other armed assaults and to
3 bring to justice any diplomats committing such grave of-
4 fenses, the President of the United States should seek a re-
5 negotiation of the Vienna Convention as to immunity from
6 criminal jurisdiction with the objective of amending article 31
7 to exempt from such immunity murder and other grave
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